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Abstract
The research focuses on the use of laboratory experimentation in
order to design an eective MBO program for the executives of the
major Italian electric utility provider (Enel). A game theoretical for-
mulation of the MBO program currently adopted by Enel is given
(baseline model) and laboratory experiments are implemented to test
(a) how experimental subjects behave within the stylized MBO pro-
gram and (b) the relative eectiveness on subjects performance of
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the introduction of two dierent institutions (liability and tourna-
ment rules) governing the assignment of incentives. Results highlight
that: 1) the baseline model resembles what has been observed in the
eld study: targets negotiated between principals and agents are easy
to fulll and a large majority of executives reach their own prize.
2) Liability rules increase the bargaining position of principals and
result overall in higher levels of target assigned to agents and corre-
sponding higher levels of performance of them; conversely no savings
are observed in terms of cost of the MBO program. 3) Tournament
rules allow to save more in MBO program costs; on the other side
performance are, on average, similar to the baseline and variance is
higher since the population splits into two sub{groups where a major-
ity of agents shows performance levels close to the case of the liability
rule while a minority of them shirk and decrease their working eort
until the minimal performance. Some indications on the use of lab-
oratory experimentation as a tool of organizational design are nally
suggested.
JEL Classication: xxx, xxx.
Keywords: Managerial compensation, Agency theory, Target based compen-
sation, Tournaments, Experimental economics.
1 Introduction
The impact of MBO on organizational productivity and workers motivation
have been largely investigated from the empirical standpoint in eld studies
involving various types of organizations, from banks (Level et al., 1990), to
airlines (Ellis, 1982), to research and development workers (Mossholder and
Dewhirst, 1980), to university faculty (Terpstra et al., 1982), to public
administration employees (Busch, 1998). Most of the empirical research
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claims that a positive relationship between the introduction of MBO and
organizational productivity does exist. Rodgers and Hunter (1991) present
a survey comprising 70 dierent studies on MBO in organizations both in
the public and private sectors. The authors show that 68 out of 70 studies
reported productivity gains as the joint result of goal setting, participation
in decision making, and objective feedback.
On the other side many empirical studies on MBO show that various
problems have been encountered with the eective implementation of the
MBO programs. One evidence of the survey of Rodgers and Hunter (1991)
is that an eective implementation of a MBO plan requires both the
support and commitment from the top management. Some diculties of
implementing a MBO device have been addressed also from the theoretical
viewpoint, for instance Halpern and Osofsky (1990) claim that the classical
formulation of MBO suer from many shortcomings such as that it does
not give protection to subordinates in the goals negotiation process and
against superior manipulation or arbitrariness. Thus one can easily derive
that the pseudo{participative property of MBO may decline to conict and
the assignment of targets and goals may be a dicult process and may not
always result in increasing rm performance.
The present study starts from the analysis of a case study about the
introduction of a MBO program within the major Italian electric utility
corporation (Enel). The MBO program, introduced during 1997, seemed to
be quite ineective with respect to the corporate aims (eliciting higher level
of eort from executives involved). Three levels of executives were subject
to the MBO: CEO, divisional directors and functional directors; evidences,
gathered using interviews to executives and data available on the MBO
program, show that objectives assigned to functional directors from their
superior (the divisional director) were low. As a result, the productivity of
functional directors was low. Thus the MBO program had little inuence
on job performance and as a matter of fact the prize connected with the
fulllment of objectives were assigned to a large majority of the executives
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involved in the program.
This study tried to understand how dierent MBO programs aect job
performance and tried to give some operative suggestions to Enel on the
way to improve its existing MBO plan. The MBO plan of Enel was given a
game theoretical formulation within the agency framework and some
laboratory experiments were designed and were ran in order to assess to
what extent the experimental outcomes were similar to the evidence
gathered in the eld study. Then, two alternative versions of the MBO
game were introduced to test the relative eectiveness of dierent
institutions (rules for assigning payos) on rm performance. Finally, the
results of experimentation was used to suggest how to modify the MBO
program currently adopted by Enel in order to make it more eective with
respect to the corporate aims.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the issue of
Management by Objectives is introduced and the case study of Enel is
described; Section 3 we compare our experimental approach to previous
empirical research. Then in Section 4 a game theoretical interpretation of
the incentive issues underlying MBO is given. Section 5 summarize our
experimental design and Section 6 the main results. Finally Section 7 gives
some conclusions, and Appendix A presents the instructions for the baseline
experiment.
2 Enel and the Management by Objective
Program
2.1 The Management by Objectives system
The idea of Management by Objectives has been rstly devised by Drucker
(1954) and gained the role of well{known managerial practice starting from
the 70's. The managerial literature on Management by Objectives is large
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and the reader interested in having a comprehensive introduction to this
issue is referred to the many existing studies (Odiorne, 1979; Reddin and
Ryan, 1988).
Here, for the limited purposes of our study we can dene Management by
Objectives as an Individual target{based system of compensation that
assigns to each involved subject a set of targets to reach within a given
working period (typically a year) and species some extra monetary
rewards (prizes) contingent to the fulllment of these targets.
Such a system of variable compensation aims principally to enhance
productivity and working eorts of people subject to it, to shape
converging expectations on future results between parties of the
organization and to make compensation more exible and variable
(allowing partial risk shifting).
2.2 The Enel implementation of a MBO system
The introduction of MBO has been a major challenge for Enel in 1997,
since in the same year the corporation experimented many crucial changes,
ranging from the introduction of budgeting systems to the transition of the
organization from a U{form to a M{form. 120 executives (within a
population of 950 exec.) were involved in the program, aimed to increase
the identication with corporate and divisional goals. The MBO system
completed the whole range of evaluation systems introduced in the previous
years in ENEL, since at lower levels in the organization executives,
managers and workers were already subject to various individual and group
incentive systems.
The executives involved in the MBO program belonged to three hierarchical
levels: CEO, divisional directors and functional directors (inside a
particular division).
1
Targets were mainly based on accounting{based
1
Some corporate sta positions were also included in the MBO program.
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measure of performance, although some qualitative measures were also
introduced. Moreover, targets were multiple and nested, so that the CEO
prize only depended on the fulllment of corporate targets, while divisional
directors prize depended both on corporate and divisional targets and
functional directors prize on corporate, divisional and functional targets.
Targets were assigned to individuals and their value was negotiated by the
executive with his hierarchical supervisor. Prizes were nested as well, and
ranged from a minimal to a maximum value depending on the degree of
fulllment of the various targets. The system of prizes and their magnitude
(about 10% of the base compensation) was set up in advance and publicly
revealed by the corporate human resource director.
In the corporate view, the introduction of the MBO plan within the higher
levels of executives aimed to foster the radical cultural change needed by
the organization to face the transition from the monopoly in the electric
utility industry to the competitive market. Previous motivational systems
had failed in this respect and resulted in giving additional bonus and perks
to executive in general with negligible, if any, connection with their actual
performance. The corporate H.R. direction thought that the introduction of
the MBO program for executives could have been eective in eliciting the
hoped changes only if the plan would have be able to remunerate only the
higher performers. Accordingly, targets should have been set so that they
would have been hard and really challenging to fulll so that only about
50% of executive involved in the program would have earned the prize.
During the rst two years of adoption of the MBO plan, ENEL
experimented many diculties both in the introduction of the new
motivational scheme and in the implementation of the stage of targets
negotiation and the one of performance evaluation. In particular:
 the introduction process was dicult since the corporation was
undertaking many organizational changes at the same time
(divisionalization, introduction of a new formal budgeting system,
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information systems re{engineering) and there were cultural inertia
and conicts in the introduction of an evaluation systems for high
level executives;
 the negotiation stage presented many shortcomings and problems,
since many supervisors were not informed enough on the corporate
aims of the MBO or familiar with the method of target negotiation
and assignment: many of them reacted to the new method giving
prudential evaluation in the assignment of targets to subordinates,
many other interpreted the MBO plan as a consensus instrument and
deliberately set low level of targets (or even delegate to the
subordinate the whole procedure of xing the targets) as a way to
gather agreement and harmony within the subordinates. In some
other cases the negotiation conict between a supervisor and his
subordinates arose, resulting in strong delays in the target setting
process;
 The performance evaluation stage was also a source of problems since
measurement diculties arose and the process of information
gathering and processing was not immune to defects.
As a result at the end of the 1998 a negative evaluation of the impact of the
MBO plan was devised by the corporate H.R. director, since targets
assigned to executives were too low and easy to fulll, performance were
not sensibly higher than in the period before the introduction of the scheme
and a large share of the executives involved in the plan won the prize (on
average over 75% of executives, with some organizational units scoring a
100%).
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3 The Research Method
In this study we took a dierent approach with respect to the standard
empirical studies on Management by Objectives. We gave a
game{theoretical formulation of the incentive issues underlying the
Management by Objectives program employed by Enel during 1997 and
1998. Then we employed laboratory experimentation in order to test in a
controlled environment how real decision makers subject to a MBO game
behave and to investigate the eect of the introduction of dierent
institutions (rules in the assignment of prizes) inside the baseline MBO
game. Results of experimentation were used to suggest to Enel how to
change their MBO plan in order to make it more eective, both on the cost
side and in eliciting higher level of performance from the executives
participating in the MBO.
The choice of an experimental approach to analyze the MBO issue of Enel
is justied if one thinks to the many diculties and shortcomings of
traditional eld experimentation both in the empirical literature (such as ex
post case studies) and in the specic case of Enel (implementation attempts
during 1997 and 1998). As a matter of fact, eld experimentation in these
settings is dicult and expensive to implement (since its introduction in
Enel the MBO program suered from low performance of executives and
high costs, given the huge share of prizes earned by executives); there are
many problems of measurements and it is dicult to judge the results of the
experimentation (it was unclear to Enel whether the bad results where to be
attributed to bad implementation of the program or conversely they were
aected by other organizational or external variables); many diculties in
the introduction, such as frictions and conicts among people involved in
the program are likely to arise (as shown above in the Enel case).
On the contrary the experimental approach has the virtue to make possible
to test various hypotheses in laboratory controlled conditions and to
evaluate their outcome before actual adoption. The laboratory environment
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allows also to minimize control and measurement diculties since
unobservable or hard to measure variables (for instance, employee
productivity, preferences and production functions) may be exogenously
controlled by the experimenter and comparative and systematic analysis of
the eects of institutional variables may be conducted ceteris paribus.
The laboratory experimental method has gathered in the past year a large
use as an instrument for institutional design, that is the test and evaluation
of laboratory trading institutions such as auctions, posted{oer markets
and many more. This stream of literature has oered, as two scholars have
clearly pointed out,
\an inexpensive way to examine various economic policy
proposals . . . experimentation may allow identication of
proposals that are unlikely to be eective, and this can shift he
burden of proof for policy proposals that do exhibit predicted
results in the laboratory." (Davis and Holt, 1993)
Inside this eld of research, a negligible attention has been given, so far, to
the issue of institutional design within organizations. Although some
behavioral studies on social dilemmas, public goods and coordination games
have focused on issues of organizational decision making (see for instance
Camerer (1999)), the theme of institutional design within organizations has
been explicitly addressed only by few experimental studies on agency issues
and incentive design. For instance, Bull et al. (1987) and Schotter and
Weigelt (1992a) focused on the eects in symmetric and asymmetric
tournaments of various institutions such as equal opportunity law and
armative actions. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) compared the eects on
workers productivity of various individual and group incentive schemes.
Schotter and Weigelt (1992b) investigated how dierent long{term bonuses
gave rise to dierent inter{temporal behavior. DeJong et al. (1985) tested
in laboratory conditions how alternative institutions, such as liability rules
and costly investigation by the principal, can mitigate the adverse eects of
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moral hazard within the agency relationship. Lo et al. (1997) investigated
the ratchet eect in a principal{agent signaling game in various conditions
of incentives, context and subject sophistication. Finally, Fehr and other
scholars studied the eectiveness of various contract enforcement devices
such as reciprocal norms and explicit incentives in the agency relationship
(Fehr et al., 1997, 1998).
Thus, the impression is that this is a eld of research relatively new and
still to be exploited and that the experimental method may be eectively
used as a \wind tunnel" tool for doing organizational design (see also Rossi
(forthcoming) for a survey of the existing experimental contributions in
agency and incentive design).
In the design of the experiments we proceeded as follows: we framed the
MBO problem within the agency framework and we modeled a simple
two{level hierarchical organization with two types of players subject to the
MBO plan: a \principal", corresponding to the divisional director (in the
Enel case), and two \agents", corresponding to functional directors. No
player corresponding to the upper hierarchical level (CEO) was introduced
in order to keep the model simple. Conversely, the eect of the upper level
was given introducing three alternative treatment of the game, reecting
dierent options of the upper hierarchical level in implementing the MBO
plan.
At rst a baseline version of the MBO problem was devised, where the
target of the principal was xed and its fulllment depended on the
performance of his agents, while each agent's target was negotiated with
the principal and each agent was given the prize depending on his own
performance. Some simplifying assumptions were introduced to model the
MBO game, in particular targets were single targets rather than multiple,
they were not modeled as nested, agents' task independence was assumed
and some assumptions about information available to players were made (as
will be clear in the following).
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Then, two alternative institutions governing the distribution of prizes were
introduced. In the liability treatment a liability rule for the principal was
devised in order to give the superior partial responsibility of the cost of the
MBO program given to his agents. When we were conducting the eld
study, this liability rule was an option that Enel was evaluating in order to
improve the commitment and the bargaining power of divisional directors
in selecting the target of their functional directors. Thus, we modeled the
liability rule in order to make rational, in the game theoretical sense, for
the principal to assign to agents high level of the targets so that they are
\dicult" to fulll and on average only one agent out of the two earn the
prize (see Section 4). We found useful to assess in the laboratory how this
rule performed with respect to the baseline version of the MBO problem.
Finally we devised an alternative institution that introduced competitive
and relative evaluation, rather than absolute, in the attribution of prizes to
the agents. The dierence of the tournament treatment with respect to
the previous one is evident: here higher levels of eort from the agents are
elicited letting the two subordinates competing for one single prize. This
rule has also the merit to be cost eective since it is designed so that only
one agent earn the prize with certainty.
In the next Section we will comment more exactly on the game{theoretical
specication of the three treatments.
4 A Game{Theoretic Model of MBO
4.1 The general framework
Imagine a corporate division having two functions: at the top of the
division there is a supervisor (from now on, principal) and each function
has a director (from now on, agent). These three individuals are all
subjected to a MBO plan.
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Each individual (the principal and the two agents) is paid a baseline
compensation of 40 monetary units and may earn a prize of 40 additional
units if he satises his production target. The principal's production target
is unknown to the agents, xed in advance and exogenously set to 10
production units by, say, the board of directors. The principal satises his
target if the joint performance level of the two agents (expressed as the
number of production units produced by the two) is equal or greater than
his production target (agents' task independence is assumed, so that the
joint production level of the agents is simply the sum of the individual
performance level of the two). Each agent's production target is negotiated
with the principal and may range from 1 to 8 production unit (integer
values allowed only). One agent satises his target if his individual
performance level is equal or greater than his production target.
The MBO game is modeled as a sequential two{stage game, as follows:
negotiation stage The principal negotiate with each agent i
(individually) the value to assign to his target t
i
2 f1; 2; : : : ; 8g.
2
The negotiation stage is modeled in a similar way to a structured
bargaining three{round game, although here the outcome of the game
are not payos assigned to the players but only the value assigned to
the agent's target (that inuence the payos of the players in the
second stage). The negotiation stage is represented in Figure 1: the
principal in the rst round makes a proposal on the value to assign to
one agent's target. If this oer is accepted by the agent, his target is
set equal to the principal's proposal and the negotiation stage ends.
Conversely, if the proposal is rejected by the agent, he can make a
counterproposal in round 2: this can be accepted by the principal,
and then the agent's target is set equal to this counterproposal and
2
In the following the negotiation process with one single agent is described , but please
note that the principal has to play two dierent negotiation stages, one with agent 1 and
one with agent 2.
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the negotiation stage ends. On the contrary, if the principal rejects
the counterproposal, in round three he can unilaterally x the target
of his agent (in a way similar to the dictator of bargaining games).
The initial proposal (round 1), the agent counterproposal (round 2)
and the nal decision by the principal (round 3) may assume integer
values within f1; 2; : : : ; 8g.
Figure 1: First phase
Negotiation is costly both to the principal and to the agents and
negotiation costs are increasing over time (this it is a common feature
of multi{stage bargaining games), as depicted in Table 1. Thus if the
agent accepts the principal's proposal they do not incur in negotiation
costs, while if the stage{game ends on round two (the principal
accepts the agent's counteroer) they both have negotiation costs of 5
monetary units; nally if stage{game ends on round three (the
principal xes the agent's target) negotiation costs amount to 10
monetary unit.
Table 1: Negotiation costs (n
i
) for the principal and for agent i as a function
of the last round of the negotiation stage
round 1 2 3
n
i
0 5 10
production stage in this second stage each agent i chooses his eort level
e
i
2 f0; 1; : : : ; 8g; then nature determines agent i performance level
(that can be interpreted as the number units produced by the agent),
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as specied in the following stochastic production function:
y
i
= e
i
+  
i
, where
 
i
=
8
<
:
0 with prob. 0.5
 1 with prob. 0.5
is a random variable that is introduced to reect the basic agency
assumption that agent i has a relative control over his performance
or, alternatively, that the principal has an imperfect technology to
measure performance.
At the end of the production stage the payo are distributed to the players.
The payo of the principal is as follows:

P
= W
P
  n
1
  n
2
;
where W
P
is the principal's compensation, n
1
are the negotiation costs with
agent 1 and n
2
the negotiation costs with agent 2. Agent i, conversely,
earns the following payo:

A
i
= W
A
i
  n
i
  c(e
i
);
where W
A
i
is the agent's compensation, n
i
are the negotiation costs with
the principal and c(e
i
) are agent i's cost of eort, that are increasing with
eort, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: cost of eort (c(e
i
)) of agent i
e
i
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
c(e
i
) 0 0.2 0.7 1.5 2.5 3.7 5.5 7.5 10
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4.2 Compensation Formulas
The three treatment (baseline, liability rule, tournament rule) only dier in
the way compensation are given to players:
Baseline Treatment (MBO
1
)
In the baseline condition both the principal and the agents earn their
individual prize if their individual target is satised: the principal earns the
prize if the joint production of his agents is equal or higher than 10,
otherwise he earns the base compensation of 40 points only, as in the
following formula:
W
P
=
8
<
:
80 if y
1
+ y
2
 10
40 otherwise
: (1)
Agent i earns his prize if his performance equals or exceeds his target,
otherwise he only earn the base compensation of 40 points, as in the
following formula:
W
A
i
=
8
<
:
80 if y
i
 t
i
40 otherwise
(2)
Liability Treatment (MBO
2
)
In the liability condition a liability rule for the principal is introduced, so
that he is made partially responsible for the cost of the MBO program
administered to the two agents. He still earns his MBO prize as in the case
of the baseline condition, but here he is also endowed an additional bonus
of 20 points if none of the two agents earns his prize or a penalty of 20
points if both of them reach their prize. If only one agent out of two earns
the prize neither the additional bonus nor the penalty are given to the
principal and his compensation is equal as in the baseline treatment.
Thus principal compensation are given in the following formula, while the
agent compensation is equal to the baseline treatment (see Eq. 2).
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W
P
=
8
<
:
80 if y
1
+ y
2
 10
40 otherwise
+
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
 20 if y
1
 t
1
and y
2
 t
2
+20 if y
1
< t
1
and y
2
< t
2
0 otherwise
Tournament Treatment (MBO
3
)
Finally in this condition while the principal's compensation is kept equal to
the baseline treatment (see Eq. 1) the production prize for the two agent
are unique and a tournament rule is set up to assign the prize to one of the
two agents. An index of satisfaction of the target by each agent is
introduced as follows:
s
i
=
y
i
  t
i
t
i
;
that measures how much the agent's performance outperforms his target.
Then, if both the agents satises their own target, since the prize is unique,
it is given to the agent presenting an higher value of the satisfaction index
(note that stakes are broken at random), as in the following formula:
W
A
i
=
8
<
:
80 if y
i
 t
i
and s
i
> s
2 i
40 otherwise
4.3 Theoretical Predictions
Let's start from the analysis of the production stage in the three treatment:
in this stage parameters were chosen so to make always optimal for an
agent to try to win the prize for every value assigned to his target (in
particular, even when it was not possible to win the prize with certainty,
such as when t = 8 or in the tournament condition).
More formally, in the baseline treatment and in the liability treatment, this
means that agent i reaction function is the following one:
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e
i
=
8
<
:
t
i
+ 1 if t
i
< 8
t
i
otherwise
:
Recalling this, the equilibrium predictions in the second and third
treatment can be easily derived. Please note that for the sake of simplicity
we will not indulge on formalism, restricting our analysis to symmetrical
initial proposals by the principal, and we will use the following notation
(x; x) to mean that the principal proposes x to both his agents.
In the liability treatment a perfect forward{looking principal will propose
(8; 8) since proposals such as (4; 4) or lower will be accepted by agents and,
given agent's reaction functions will not allow the principal to earn his
prize. Again, proposals equal to (5; 5), (6; 6) or (7; 7) will be avoided by the
principal, since they will be accepted by the agents and will result in both
the agents to fulll their target with certainty, and then in a penalty of 20
points for the principal. Agents will accept the principal proposing (8; 8)
because any counterproposal will never be accommodated by the principal,
since, at that point, it will be always optimal for him to x independently
both targets to 8 in the last round of the negotiation, earning on average
the same payo as he would have had if he proposed to agents lower
proposals, such as (7; 7). As a result average performance of the agents will
be equal to 7:5.
In the tournament conditions things go dierently: in the production stage
the reaction functions for the agents are dierent than in the previous
cases, since it will be always optimal for an agent to put up the higher
available eort (8), no matter what the target is. Recalling this, in the rst
stage of the game the agent will decline any proposal by the principal
dierent from 1, since it will be optimal for any agent to counterpropose 1
(and this counterproposal will be eventually accepted by the principal). A
perfect forward looking principal, then, will oer (1; 1), and this oer will
be obviously accepted by the agents. Once again, average performance of
17
A. Rossi and M. Warglien
the agents will be equal to 7:5, and, as mentioned above, on average only
one agent out of the two will earn the MBO prize.
Deriving the equilibrium conditions for the baseline treatment is less
straightforward: since the value of X is unknown to the agents we have to
solve a incomplete information game. Before to give a more precise idea of
theoretical prescriptions in this case we will derive the equilibrium in the
case of X known by the agents. Here, as in the liability treatment, the
principal will avoid to propose to agents proposal such as (4; 4) or lower,
since he will not earn the prize. On the other side proposal such as (8; 8) or
(7; 7) will result, to some extent, in some rejections and counterproposal by
the agents.
Take for instance the (7; 7) proposal: recalling that the negotiation stage is
simultaneously played by the agents, for each agent will be optimal to
counterpropose 3 if the other agent accepted the principal's proposal, since
the principal will accept and the agent will put up an eort equal to 4 to
win the prize, saving 7.5 points (in eort costs), while spending only 5
additional points (as the result of the negotiation). On the other side for
each agent will be optimal to accept the principal proposal if the other
agent counterproposed 3, since on the contrary his counteroer will be
rejected by the principal (which will x the target again up to 7) with 50%
probability. Thus, if the principal propose (7; 7) a mixed{strategy
equilibrium does exist so that with positive probability each agent will
reject the principal proposal. As a result a perfect forward looking principal
in this case will propose (6; 6) or (5; 5). Both these proposals will be
accepted by agents and average performance values will be, respectively,
equal to 6.5 and 5.5. Eventually this will result in all the agents winning
the prize.
Since the value of X is unknown, rather than known, to the agents, formal
analysis in this case does not allow to exclude a level of the targets equal to
(7; 7) or (8; 8), since this strongly depends on the beliefs of the agent on the
value of X. Thus in this case we believe that past experience and feedback
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on the compensation earned by the principal should over time update the
agents' beliefs on the value of X towards its real value. As a result, we
predicts that outcomes in the last rounds of the experiment should be
similar to the ones predicted in the case of perfect information of X.
5 The Experimental Design
In order to investigate the eect of dierent MBO plans on individual and
group performance we ran a set of three dierent experiments involving 99
college undergraduates recruited at the University of Trento (Italy) during
January 1999; 77 of them were undergraduates in Economics, the remaining
ones came from other faculties. Subjects were recruited through
announcements on bulletin boards in the Faculty of Economics and were
asked to show up to the Computable and Experimental Economic
Laboratory. The announcements claimed that subjects would have been
engaged in an experiment lasting about 1 hour and would have be able to
win up to 50000 italian liras (approximately equal to 28 US dollars).
During the experiment subjects earned experimental points that were at
the end converted in italian liras at the rate of 41 italian lira per
experimental point. The exchange rate was known in advance by all
subjects and was chosen so that 50000 italian liras corresponded to the
maximum amount of money that subjects could earn. Their average nal
payo was about 35000 italian liras (approximately equal to 19 US dollars),
an amount which seemed more than sucient to motivate them.
The subjects were randomly divided in groups of 3 subjects who remained
anonymously grouped during the entire experiment; the role of principal or
agent was also randomly assigned and subjects were asked not to reveal
their role. Then subjects were seated in front of computer terminals. After
reading the experiment's instructions
3
(and having them read aloud by an
3
A translation from italian of instructions is in Appendix A.
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experimental administrator) and answering aloud to any question
4
, the
experiment begun. Interaction between subjects were reduced to the
minimum during the experiment: each subject could see some two other
participants but not their terminal monitors and verbal communication was
not allowed. Since one group could nish the experiment earlier than the
others, participants were asked to remain seated at their desk and to ll an
application form needed for the payment.
Any experiment consisted in the repetition of 15 identical rounds of one of
the three MBO game discussed in Section 4. 15 rounds were considered a
reasonable length of time for learning to occur while being not too
challenging for subjects involved in the experiment. After each round,
subjects were given feedback on the outcome of the game. In particular:
 the principal was given information on his payo, on the targets and
the performance of each agent, and on the negotiation costs he had
with each agent;
 each agent was given information on his payo, on his target, on his
eort, on his performance and on the compensation (40 or 80 points)
assigned to the principal (the reason this last information was given to
agents is that the principal could easily infer, given his information,
whether one agent had received his production prize or not).
No information on payos earned by the other two subjects in the group
was given to participants; anyway, due to the information given, a principal
may approximately compute the payo of each agent and each agent could
approximately compute the principal's payo. Note also that each agent in
general had no feedback at all on the payo earned by the other agent. The
only relevant exception is in the tournament treatment, since if one agent
fullled his target but was not given the production prize, he could easily
infer that the prize had been given to the other agent.
4
Subjects were also told to ask questions without revealing their role.
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The payo of each subject at the end of the experiment were simply the
sum of the payos earned by him during the 15 rounds.
The experimental design was the following: each subject was engaged in
only one experiment; 10 groups, for a total of 30 subjects, were assigned
both to the baseline and to the tournament treatment while the
tournament treatment was dispensed to the remaining remaining 13 groups,
for a total of 39 subjects.
6 Results
In order to present the results of the experiments we will proceed as follows:
rst we will compare how the three MBO program performed in terms of
levels of target assigned to the agents and performance of the agents, then
we will illustrate some more specic regularities arising during the
experiments.
Table 3 collects descriptive statistics for the three experiments.
5
Figure 2
and 3 presents, respectively, mean and median target levels assigned to
agents in the negotiation stage for each round of the experiments.
Let's start from the analysis of the baseline treatment. Mean target values
uctuate around 5 (with a slight upward tendency) conrming, on average,
the theoretical predictions.
Agents' performance follows the same uctuating trend around 5, although
a slightly increasing trend can be observed (see Figures 4 and 5, that
respectively collect mean and median agents performance levels). Mean
values are lower than theoretical predictions. This can be explained
considering that the mean value are diminished by the low performance of
those subjects that decided not to fulll their target. Moreover, the slightly
upward trend is both due to a diminishing number of shirking agents over
5
To economize in space this table and some of the gures collect data from the three
treatments.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
MBO1 MBO2 MBO3
Mean Target Levels
All rounds 5.1 6.1 5.2
Last 5 rounds 5.2 6.3 5.1
First round 4.6 5.3 5.1
Last round 5.2 6.6 5.2
Mean Performance Levels
All rounds 4.9 5.9 5.2
Last 5 rounds 5.2 6.2 5.2
First round 4.2 5.3 5.3
Last round 5.4 6.4 5
Agents Earning the Prize
All rounds 69% 72% 46%
Last 5 rounds 79% 75% 48%
Figure 2: Mean Target Levels.
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Figure 3: Median Target Levels.
time (from 27% of the observation in the rst 5 periods to 15% in the 5
nal periods) and to a diminishing frequency over time of a particular
pattern of action. Actually, a closer look to data shows that some agents,
aiming to fulll their target, choose, especially during the early rounds of
the experiment, an eort value equal to the target, apparently not caring to
expose themselves to a lottery (recalling that the performance in the 50% of
the cases is equal to the eort minus one, a subject choosing an eort equal
to his target earns the prize, on average, only in the 50% of times). This
pattern of action occurs in the 31% of the observations in the rst 5 rounds
and declines to the 14% in the last 5 rounds. A possible explanation may
be that subjects are risk{seeking and prefer to save on cost of eort even if
they expose themselves to the risk of not earning the prize. This may be
the case but it seems poorly sustainable since one should assume an
extreme degree of risk{seeking to justify that. A more plausible
interpretation of this behavior may be that some subjects fails to
understand, especially at the beginning of the game, that the optimal
response in order to earn the prize with certainty is to choose an eort
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equal to 1 unit higher than the target. This latter interpretation was
conrmed, to some extent, also from some ex{post interviews made with a
small sample of the subjects that supported also the evidence that subjects
actually learned over time that the optimal response was to produce an
eort one unit higher than their target.
Figure 4: Mean Performance Levels.
Finally, the share of agents earning the prize was equal to 79% (value
computed using the last 5 rounds data). The discrepancy with respect to
the theoretical prediction of 100% did not depend on \dicult" targets set
by principals (the target was set equal to 8 only on 4 out of 300
observation). This depended, on the contrary, on two alternative reasons:
on the one side some agents intentionally failed to fulll their target in
order to reciprocate to a principal xing targets interpreted by agents as
\unfair". In some other cases (such as in the eort=target) the reciprocity
hypothesis seemed less plausible and the hypothesis of bad comprehension
of the rule of the game was assumed. In some sense the design of the
experiment did not allow to perfectly discriminate between this two
explaination of observed behavior; later in this section we will turn again to
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Figure 5: Median Performance Levels.
the theme of reciprocity in the three treatments.
The liability treatment presents a dierent picture: mean and median
targets levels are higher than in the baseline treatment and both show a
clear upward tendency over time. Nevertheless target levels are, on average,
distant from the theoretical predictions (which state that the principal
proposes intrinsically \dicult" levels of target, equal to 8, to both his
agents), that are fullled only in the 16% of the observations. Anyway,
there is clear evidence that principals present during the negotiation a
behavior more rm and uncompromising than what they did in the baseline
treatment: for instance the negotiation stage ends in the third round
(corresponding to the principal unilaterally stating the value to be assigned
to his agent) in the 11% of the observations (compared to 5% in the
baseline treatment). At the same time also agents seems to be aware that
the liability rule gives the principal a strong incentive to x high level of
targets, and this is reected by the higher level of fulllment (again
compared to the baseline), in the production stage, of the targets by the
agents, as shown by Figure 6, where the value of 41% of fulllment when
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targets are set to the maximum value (8) is close to the expected
theoretical value (50%).
Figure 6: Frequency of Fulllment of Agents' Target with Respect to the
Value Assigned to the Target.
Thus, it seems that in the liability treatment the strategy of agents of
intentionally shirk in order to reciprocate to high level of targets is here less
used than in the baseline treatment. On the contrary, agents here seem to
use more the reciprocal device of negotiation: in more than the 50% of the
observations, when the principal proposed 8 as target, the agent did not
agree and made a counterproposal, eventually forcing the principal to
sustain additional negotiation costs. We suggest that this strong tendency
of agents to reciprocate inicting negotiation costs during the negotiation
stage and the more limited tendency of the agents to reciprocate and shirk
during the production stage jointly bring principals to give up their
tendency towards setting \dicult" targets and to set them at levels lower
than theoretical predictions.
We proved evidence that principals are not able to elicit the highest level of
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performance by their agents. While mean target levels were higher than in
the baseline treatment, it was still possible, for an agent willing to earn the
prize, to fulll his target with certainty (by choosing an eort level equal to
the target plus one unit). As a result the shares of the agents earning the
MBO prize were not signicantly dierent from the baseline experiment
(75% of the agents in the observations of the last 5 rounds). This resulted
in the liability penalty to be assigned to the principal in almost 60% of the
observations (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Frequency Histogram of Principal's Compensation in the Liability
Treatment (MBO2).
Finally, in the tournament treatment both mean / median targets levels
and mean performance levels were not signicantly dierent than in the
baseline treatment (in contrast with theoretical speculations). Anyway, at a
closer look, the data reveal that variance of behavior in this treatment is
much more higher. As a matter of fact, agents divide into two dierent
subgroups: a large majority of them (approximatively 75%) presenting
levels of performance similar to the liability treatment, and the rest of them
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shirking and avoiding almost completely working eort. Figure 8, which
shows the frequency histogram of performance observed in the three
treatments, conrms this evidence: in the tournament condition the
performance frequency distribution is bimodal, with a low modal value at 0
and a high modal value at 7 (as in the liability condition).
This result is similar to what has been observed in experiments on
asymmetrical and unfair tournaments (Bull et al., 1987; Schotter and
Weigelt, 1992a), where it is shown that disadvantaged agents participating
in a two{person rank order tournament may present eort levels higher
than the optimal value or may alternatively shrink and disengage from the
tournament. In this setting over{performance of disadvantaged agents is
interpreted assuming that agents maximize an utility function that takes
into account not only earnings but, to some extent, also the fact to gain the
prize in itself (even if costs connected with the eort levels needed to reach
the prize with the same probability of the advantaged participant are not
optimal for the disadvantaged participant). On the other side,
under{performance and disengagement from working eort by some other
disadvantaged agents is interpreted assuming that disadvantaged agents
learned to shirk as the joint result, in the early stages of the game, of bad
luck (in stochastic realizations and in splitting stakes) and aggressive play
of opponents.
We believe that a similar explanation may apply in the case of our
tournament experiment: even if some dierences do exist (there are not
disadvantaged agents and high performers presents eort levels below
rather than over the theoretical predictions), shrinking arises as the result
of repeated bad luck experienced during the early rounds of the game
agents that fulll their production target but which, due to the tournament
rule, are not assigned the MBO prize, tend to lower their working eorts in
the next round in order to save on eort costs and tend to shirk over time,
relying on the sure compensation of 40 points and without incurring in
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eort costs.
6
This is, in some sense, surprising, as well as surprising is that, despite the
mean target levels proposed by principals not being dierent to the baseline
case, negotiation activity from the agents is not as high as one could expect.
This two evidences, as well as many other details in the negotiation stage of
the three treatment, still need to be investigated more systematically.
Figure 8: Frequency Histogram of Performance Levels (last 5 round).
In brief, we can summarize our main experimental ndings looking at
Figure 9, that plots the relationship between mean performance levels of
agents and expected additional costs of the MBO program with respect to
the case where only one agent out of the two earns the prize. As noted
above, both the liability and the tournament rule dominates the baseline
version, and suggest the clearly highlight the existence of a trade{o
between performance and cost{eectiveness.
6
It should be recalled that in the tournament treatment it is always optimal, in the
game{theoretical sense, to put up the maximum eort in order to maximize the chances
of winning the MBO prize.
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Figure 9: Mean Performance Levels and Expected Additional Cost of the
Plan in the Three Treatments (0% corresponds to no additional costs when
only one agent out of the two earns the prize).
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7 Discussion
This paper suggests a rst attempt to make use of laboratory
experimentation for organizational design purposes: we presented a
game{theoretical model of Management by Objectives and introduced three
alternative institutional rules aecting how prizes are distributed to
subjects. Then we conducted laboratory experimentation of the three
models and we focused on their eects on rm's productivity. Main results
of our study are the following ones: we found that the introduction of a
liability rule for superiors increases their bargaining position and, as a
result, targets of subordinates are set higher and consequently performance
of them are higher. Anyway targets and performance are far from the
theoretical predictions since subordinates reciprocate when superiors
propose high levels of the target; as a consequence the liability rule is then
ineective in controlling the cost of the MBO program (in terms of amount
of prizes given to subjects) since, even if targets are set higher than the
baseline, it is still possible for the agents to earn the prize with certainty.
On the other hand, the tournament treatment proves to be a cost eective
mechanism while, on average, performance are not higher than in the
baseline. A closer look to data shows that the introduction of a competitive
rule in the assignment of the agents' prize results in eliciting in a large
majority of the agents (75%) levels of eort similar to the ones observed in
the liability treatment, while a minority of agents (25%) disengages from
work and presents low levels of performance.
We are aware of the many risks of trying to generalize these laboratory
ndings to real workplaces and, in particular, to the Enel case. Our
experimental design focused on the economic incentive properties of
alternative Management by Objectives plan, ruling out intentionally many
elements, such as communication, peer pressure, reputation, and many
other extra{economic elements that characterizes the interactions among
workers and are at the core of MBO.
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Nevertheless we also believe that the analysis of the results of
experimentation in the MBO settings may be useful not only to test how
much the theoretical predictions of the economic model explain the
behavior observed in laboratory conditions; but also to give, even using
data from a simple and controlled environment, a rough idea on what
behavioral response should be expected in a real setting as the result of the
introduction of a dierent reward formula within an existing Management
by Objectives program.
It is clear then that the adoption of a particular rule should be evaluated
carefully, keeping in mind both the limits of experimental results and the
corporate aims that drive the introduction of a Management by Objectives
program within the organization. With respect to the former aspect, one
should consider that the introduction of competitive rules such as in the
tournament treatment may result as eective in eliciting high levels of
performance as the liability rule if shirking could be detected and
successfully avoided by the organization (for instance through monitoring
by superiors or even by co{workers). With respect to the latter argument
(corporate aims), it should be noted that the tournament version of the
MBO may be an optimal selection device for an organization aiming to
foster high levels of turnover and to discriminate among workers high from
low performers.
A Experiment Instructions
This appendix presents the instructions (translated from italian) given to
subjects engaged in the baseline treatment of the experiment. Instruction
for the other two treatment are identical with the exception of specic in-
structions on the additional bonus / penalty in the liability treatment and
on the tournament rule in the tournament treatment.
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A.1 Introduction
You are participating to an economic experiment. You are kindly asked
to carefully read the instructions. Then you will be able to ask questions
that will be openly answered. This experiment will last about one hour.
If you follow the instructions closely and make decisions carefully, during
the experiment you can earn experimental points that at the end of the
experiment will be converted into italian liras (1 experimental point = 41
italian liras).
A.2 Instructions
During the whole experiment you are anonymously matched with other two
players in this room. One of the players is called Principal (from now on, P )
and the other two players are called agent 1 and agent 2 (A
1
e A
2
). Matching
will be performed at random by the computer program at the beginning of
the experiment and will not revealed. During the experiment your role will
be the one of (principal / agent 1 / agent 2).
In the experiment P , A
1
e A
2
are paid a xed compensation of 40 points
and a production prize of 40 additional points (that depends on the fulllment
of production targets). For A
1
(e similarly for A
2
) the fulllment of his target
depends on his output, that depends on his level of work eort. This is costly
to A
1
(as it is for A
2
): higher levels of work eort mean higher costs. The
fulllment of P 's target, conversely, depends on the sum of the outputs of
the two agents. P 's target is xed in advance, while the target of each agent
is decided through negotiation between the principal and the agent. This
negotiation is costly, both to the principal and to the agents.
The experiment involves the repetition for 15 times (rounds) of the fol-
lowing two phases:
First phase
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(Please note that in the following the instructions will refer only to A
1
but the same apply also to A
2
). In this phase P have to state with A
1
the value to assign to A
1
's production target (and with A
2
the value to
assign to A
2
's production target). If during the second phase A
1
fullls
his target (regardless of what A
2
or P does) he wins 80 points (40 p. as
the xed compensation + 40 p. as the production prize for the fulllment
of his target), conversely if the target is not fullled he will win the xed
compensation of 40 points only.
A
1
's target may range within the following values: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
The higher a target is xed, the costly is for him to fulll it, since the work
eort is costly.
Figure 1: First phase
In order to set the target of A
1
at the beginning of this phase P have to
propose to A
1
a value. He may accept this value as his target or counterpro-
pose another value. Then P may accept A
1
's counterproposal or reject it; in
the latter case P will set A
1
's target as he wish (see Figure 1).
If A
1
does not accept P 's initial oer the negotiation is costly both to P
and to A
1
: if P accepts A
1
's counteroer they both have negotiation costs
equal to 5 points; on the contrary if P reject A
1
's counteroer and x his
target as he wish, the negotiation costs are equal to 10 points for both.
Negotiation costs at the end of the round will be subtracted to the amount
P will win (40 or 80 points) in order to compute his real payo of the round.
A
1
's payo will be his win (40 or 80 points) minus his negotiation costs and
minus his eort costs.
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The rst phase ends when both the production target of A
1
and the one
of A
2
are set.
Second Phase
In the second phase A
1
(the same holds for A
2
) decides his level of working
eort, within the following values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
Working eort is costly to A
1
, as shown in the following table:
eort level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
costs 0 0.2 0.7 1.5 2.5 3.7 5.5 7.5 10
The output produced by A
1
depends jointly on his eort and on chance
with probability 50% his output will be equal to his level of eort, otherwise
will be equal his level of eort minus one unit. Thus his output will be as
follows:
output =
8
<
:
effort with prob. 50%
effort  1 with prob. 50%
Thus A
1
payo will be equal to his compensation (80 points if his output
will be equal or greater than his target, 40 points otherwise), minus his
negotiation costs, minus his eort costs.
P target is xed and is equal to X; if the joint output of the two agents
is equal or greater than X, P win 80 points (40 p. as the xed compensation
+ 40 p. as the production prize for the fulllment of his target), conversely if
P 's target is not fullled P will win the xed compensation of 40 points only.
The real value of X will be communicated only to P , before the experiment
start.
P payo will then be equal to P 's win minus his negotiation costs.
End of the round
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At the end of the round the computer program will display to P this
information: A
1
's target, his negotiation costs with A
1
, A
1
's output, A
2
's
target, his negotiation costs with A
2
, A
2
's output, and his payo.
The computer program will display to each agents this information: his
target, his negotiation costs, his output, his eort, his payo and the amount
of points won by P (80 or 40 points).
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